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I shall consider human actions and 
appetites just as if it were a question of 
lines, planes, and bodies.
—Spinoza, in Ethics
This quote from Spinoza seems an unlikely launch-
ing pad for a discussion of the new intimacies aris-
ing between humans’ bigness and big data. Yet, by 
considering human activities through the elegant, 
elemental figures of geometry, we shall see how 
Spinoza gets us straight into the thick thicknesses 
of things.
Big data refers to the massive quantity of 
records that are captured, amassed, and mined in 
the wake of digitally structured actions. It is the 
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sum total of records of actions—the exponential 
archive of every component transaction captured 
in every data trail. These actions may originate 
from human or nonhuman protagonists (e.g., 
online shoppers or particle accelerators) and may 
describe human or nonhuman referents (e.g., med-
ical data or atmospheric data). But this essay will 
not address data generated by or descriptive of 
nonhuman objects. Instead, I will adopt an object-
oriented feminist perspective, arriving at the non-
human by following big data as it restructures the 
human.1 Beginning with the work that humans—
in the conventional sense, individual subjects—do 
as the producers of big data, I’ll describe how, by 
wielding Spinoza’s “lines, planes, and bodies,” big 
data unproduces and deindividualizes its subjects 
to become transhuman objects, something, I’ll 
argue, far vaguer than any small subject could be. 
This essay will also show how, through its 
materiality, big data models what I call decel-
erationist aesthetics. In decelerationist aesthet-
ics, the aesthetic properties, proclivities, and 
performances of objects come to defy the accel-
erationist imperative to be nimbly individu-
ated.2 Decelerationist aesthetics rejects atomistic, 
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liberal, humanist subjects; this unit of self is too 
consonant with capitalist relations and functions. 
Instead, decelerationist aesthetics favors transhu-
man sociality embodied in particulate, mattered 
objects; the aesthetic form of such objects resists 
capitalist speed and immediacy by taking back 
and taking up space and time. In just this way, as 
we shall see, big data calls into question the con-
ventions by which humans are defined as discrete 
entities, and individual scales of agency are made 
to form central binding pillars of social existence 
through which bodies are drawn into relations of 
power and pathos.
So let us begin. En route, as we work our way 
up to Spinoza’s “lines, planes, and bodies,” we’ll 
start by taking stock of the simplest geometrical 
unit: the point.
4      KaTherine Behar      5 
4      KaTherine Behar      5 
Points
Amassing data Points
“Data is the plastic of [the] new New Economy,” 
announces GigaOM founder Om Malik,3 thereby 
suggesting—without a shred of cynicism—that like 
plastic, data is malleable enough to meet every 
conceivable need, and its resulting pervasiveness 
will transform every nook and cranny of the global 
economy. Yet we can take data’s comparison to 
plastic in another way, too. Consider the oft-cited 
University of Southern California study that cal-
culated the world’s data in 2007 at 295 exabytes, 
which, burned to disc, would fill a stack of CDs 
reaching beyond the moon. This memorably stag-
gering quantity of CDs is an appropriate analogy, 
because CDs are junk plastic, a breath away from 
landfill. Big data is plastic in this sense too—it per-
sists, awfully, smothering us with its uselessness. 
Even so, big data maintains an unshakeable 
aura of worth. On the one hand, enterprise stands 
ready to reap it, no doubt at least in part informed 
by the realization that humans are at real risk of 
depleting organic resources in the natural world. 
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And indeed, the buzz around big data leaves corpo-
rations breathless with anticipation over potential 
profit from what appears to be an inexhaustible 
geyser of bits. On the other hand, big data’s buzz 
renders individual consumers breathless for a dif-
ferent reason; they are flushed-faced with caution 
and reproach, indignant over worth stolen away.
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Surely enough, a major source of big data is 
the tracking of individuals’ online activity in 
Internet storefronts, social media spaces, and the 
like. In a typical process, humans’ transactions 
are tracked and captured in profiles in the form 
of personally identifiable data points, which are 
seamlessly aggregated by corporations, and cross 
compared or “mined” through analytics. Value is 
created when large-scale patterns, which emerge 
in analytics, can be tied back to the original data 
points and, by extension, to the profiles of indi-
vidual producers and consumers.4 Because this 
process occurs at multiple levels and is likely to 
span multiple proprietary platforms, data owner-
ship is fraught.
As a result, many individuals take exception to 
what they see as the exploitation of their personal 
data, and protest for the establishment of legal 
protections5 and technical constraints6 to regulate 
the collection and use of personally identifiable 
data.7 Yet, the argument to protect personal data 
from exploitation is an odd objection because, on 
the face of things, it mistakes what data under 
capitalism is. Is data like plastic, or is it something 
special, distinctive—even distinctively human? 
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Plainly enough, data seems to be like plastic, 
the product of human labor—it is, after all, pro-
duced by all that clicking. But seeing our personal 
data in a corporation’s clutches leaves us feeling 
violated, and our instinctive urge to protect it 
amounts to treating data as no ordinary product, 
but something very personal: an extension, I would 
contend, of the physical human body. Indeed, 
arguments for data privacy rhetorically position 
data as bodily (deserving of the same protections 
from exploitation under capitalism that the body 
itself enjoys), rather than as a product of labor 
(which is fair game for capitalist exploitation). 
In “The Body as Accumulation Strategy,” David 
Harvey explains, “While capitalists may have full 
rights to the commodity labor power, they do not 
have legal rights over the person of the laborer 
(that would be slavery).”8 He continues, “The capi-
talist has not the formal right to put the body of 
the person at risk . . . and working practices that 
do so are open to challenge.”9 I suggest that these 
are the same grounds on which big data practices 
are disputed. If we take seriously this weird recat-
egorization of object as part-of-subject, Obama’s 
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Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights10 is directly analo-
gous to OSHA.11
Note that Harvey’s concerns lie with labor 
power, something produced by a category of 
action that cannot originate with any individual. 
Human subjects labor to make big data and have 
something at stake in each singular data point, 
but labor power happens at a “bigger” scale that is 
beyond the subject.
Scale, i.e., “bigness,” is big data’s source, its 
promise, and its Achilles’ heel. For example, the 
Economist, Forbes, and the World Economic Forum 
have predicted a “data deluge,”12 and tech journal-
ist Colin Brown describes “a world gorging on data 
in the hope of turning those information streams 
into rivers of gold”13—which is to say, into a com-
modity just like gold, which would have mini-
mal use value and might come to exist purely in 
exchange. The nightmare is to let data accumulate 
in unusable surpluses of unordered data points. 
All hopes are pinned on managing big data, effi-
ciently processing the records that capture use 
to extract value for exchange. So big data is at 
once confusingly close to us and our bodies, and 
always on the verge of becoming just junk, neither 
10      KaTherine Behar      11 points






In a recent essay on big data, “‘ The whole is 
always smaller than its parts’—a digital test of 
Gabriel Tarde’s monads,” Bruno Latour et al. 
describe a data reduction process, a data manage-
ment method for producing valuable insights by 
enacting delimitation in a heterogeneous field of 
data points. To accomplish this, Latour et al. rec-
ommend drawing a line.
Or more specifically, they suggest drawing a 
potato:
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The first [method for handling data sets] 
is the very humble and often unnoticed 
gesture we all make when we surround 
a list of features with a circle (a shape 
often referred to as a ‘potato’!).14 
Latour et al. are concerned with developing a 
theory that does not lapse into two levels of anal-
ysis for dealing with individuals and aggregates. 
Tarde’s theory of monads is an elusive, “admit-
tedly exotic notion” borrowed from Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz. In bare terms, Latour et al. define 
a monad as “not a part of a whole, but a point of 
view on all other entities taken severally and not 
as a totality.”15 Tarde’s monads offer the type 
of “one level standpoint” Latour et al. seek, and 
they suggest that the contemporary practice of 
navigating databases provides a working proof of 
Tarde’s thought. An in-depth discussion of Tarde 
and Latour is beyond the scope of this essay, but 
it is instructive that Latour’s examples are drawn 
from the problem of searching for the identity of 
a human individual within a vast data set. Latour 
et al. search by name—what could be more sub-
ject-oriented?—and their strategy for ordering 
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the undifferentiated sprawl of heterogeneous raw 
data is to group data points by drawing a figure. 
Their “humble . . . unnoticed gesture” of inscribing 
a line traces an edge and lends shape to a contour; 
they are drawing a profile.
A profile is a contour, a representation in 
outline that renders significant features. Latour’s 
potato is precisely the use of a line to inscribe 
a profile into a plane of aggregated data, to 
create an outlined representation for the very 
purpose of “consider[ing] human actions and 
appetites.” While in this particular instance Latour 
is, for once, after the human, his drawing operation 
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applies equally to nonhuman objects, and a similar 
linear gesture appears in object-oriented ontology, 
in the “general inscriptive strategy” Ian Bogost, 
following Graham Harman, calls ontography.16
According to Bogost, the most basic kind of 
ontography is a list, which, as you may recall, 
is what Latour’s potato encloses. “Ontography,” 
Bogost explains, “is an aesthetic set theory.”17 
While the potato encircles on a principle of 
affiliation, the list deploys a line to line things up, 
stressing difference through rhetorical disjunc-
tion.18 Yet, both are a means of enticing a form, 
while allowing irreducibility. 
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But if the point of the profile is to render sig-
nificant features, the identifiable silhouette of 
an individual, what are we to make of the non-
descriptive graphical quality that takes place 
in the lining up of an ontographic list, which 
according to Bogost only “reveals” “on the basis 
of existence” without “necessarily offering clari-
fication or description”19? Rhetorical strategies 
aside, what good is the “profile” of this proffered 
potato? 
Latour might demur, but he and his colleagues 
state, “The gesture of adding a circle is simply the 
recognition of the outside limit of a monad.”20 It 
seems that at best, this will be a lumpy approxi-
mation, too blobby for portraiture and too vague 
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to aid identification. Surely, there comes a tipping 
point wherein the more detail one adds to this pro-
file—the more points one encloses in its line—the 
more bloated and less descriptive it becomes. This 
overstuffed potato has an odd profile indeed! 
Ontography, too, is susceptible to swelling. 
Writes Bogost, it “is a practice of increasing the 
number and density. . . . Instead of removing ele-
ments to achieve the elegance of simplicity [which 
would be data reduction] ontography adds (or 
simply leaves) elements to accomplish the real-
ism of multitude.”21 Blogger David Berry makes 
a suggestive link between object-oriented ontol-
ogy’s propensity to pack it in and Heidegger’s 
notion of gigantism.22 Though Berry protests 
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the intermingling of humans and nonhumans in 
object-oriented litanies, the very “contamination” 
he fears signals the nonanthropocentric impurity 
this essay seeks to promote. The gigantic is a tell-
ing figure; it is a pathological figure, a figure in 
excess of self.
Big data’s pathological overaccumulations 
symptomize capitalist excess, like plastic, and 
big data threatens to bloat a naive profile into a 
totality. Indeed, Latour et al. confirm, “Were the 
inquiry to continue, the ‘whole world’, as Leibniz 
said, would be ‘grasped’ or ‘reflected’ through this 
idiosyncratic point of view.”23 A thusly inflated 
profile recalls the David Foster Wallace charac-
ter Norman Bombardini, who resolves to perma-
nently overcome the loneliness inherent in what 
Tarde and Latour call a two-level-standpoint uni-
verse, divided between Self and Other, individual 
and aggregate.24 Bombardini fixates on filling the 
entire universe with Self, squeezing Otherness out 
of the (profile) picture by aggressive consump-
tion, an anti–Weight Watchers, reverse-diet plan 
to grow to infinite size. Like Bombardini, big data 
bingeing balloons a profile into another sign of big 
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capitalist excess, another symptomatic silhouette 
of surplus: obesity. 
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Planes
PoPulating a common Plane
The subtitle of the essay “Slow Death” by the inim-
itable Lauren Berlant is a parenthetical ontograph, 
“(Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency).”25 The last 
item, lateral agency, takes place across a common 
plane, zoned for occupancy26 and populated by a 
host of factors and actors. Mimicking the plane’s 
extensiveness, Berlant describes “ordinary life” as 
including and constituted by “spreading-out activ-
ities like sex or eating.”27 Devoting her essay to 
describing what is “vague and gestural about the 
subject”28 (not unlike our bloated tuber), Berlant 
traces the slow spread of obesity’s profile as “not a 
thing, but a cluster of factors that only looks solid 
at a certain distance.”29 
Bogost writes, “An ontograph is a crowd,”30 
and for Berlant, too, the cluster that coheres is col-
lective, crowd-like. In contrast to the individual 
profile Latour et al. shaped by including points 
to reference a person, obesity precludes person-
hood. For Berlant, it is always “oriented toward 
. . . self-abeyance,”31 toward what she calls self-
suspension, as opposed to self-negation.32 Obesity 
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is an instance of biopower that dismantles indi-
vidual sovereignty, and indeed, Berlant sees obe-
sity’s profile embodying (so to speak) biopower 
and its relationship to managerial control. Obesity 
is an endemic, not an epidemic, a chronic condi-
tion requiring perpetual management, not a crisis 
in need of a cure; and it deals in populations, not 
persons. The same could be said of big data. Both 
are surfeits set for management and the more we 
eat and click, the more management we require. 
Berlant uses the term actuarial rhetoric to 
describe both the material effects of the actuarial 
production of data, i.e., the fat data of statistics 
and policy, and in a figuratively broader sense, to 
convey how actuarial management strives “to get 
the fat (the substance and the people) under con-
trol.”33 With actuarial rhetoric, obesity contains 
fat-as-substance, fat-as-people, and data-as-fat. 
Patricia Ticineto Clough and her collaborators 
also deal with self-abeyance in their own strange 
blend of substance and people in “Notes Towards 
a Theory of Affect-Itself.”34 Drawing from “reso-
nances” with information theory, the life sciences, 
and physics, they propose to “mov[e] beyond the 
laborer’s body assumed in the labor theory of 
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value [which is referred] to as the body-as-organ-
ism” to arrive at a new conception of bodies “aris-
ing out of . . . matter as informational.”35 
Echoing Berlant’s individual’s self-abeyance, 
Clough et al. cite Akseli Virtanen and Paolo Virno 
to describe how affective labor has been theo-
rized as “superced[ing] the individual” through an 
“abstract labor-power that is in excess of any one 
laborer’s body.” Pursuing this notion further, they 
ask whether it is also “in excess of the body con-
ceived as human organism.”36 Whereas prior theo-
ries of affective labor already started suppressing 
personhood in favor of populations, shedding 
the sanctity of the individual laborer in favor of 
a “social individual,” Clough et al.’s radical move 
extends the notion of population well beyond the 
social individual or crowd, and into the nonhuman 
world, the informational world of data. 
Theorizing that “the distinction between 
organic and non-organic matter is dissolving 
in relationship to information,” they conclude 
that “labor power must be treated in terms of 
an abstraction [that could accommodate] bodies 
that are beyond the [organic/nonorganic] distinc-
tion altogether.”37 This move to view the material 
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structure of labor power as informational is critical. 
Indeed, it is information that gives the form—fills 
out the profiles—of the bodies we have potatoed 
thus far. Recalling that for Harvey, the commod-
ity was never data, but always the labor power 
traded in data’s production, and that for Berlant, 
individual sovereignty can’t be recuperated under 
biopower, this move to make ourselves bigger, to 
“spread out” into “information-as-matter,” or to 
include data in our own mattering makes sense if 
we are to set our “selves” aside, self-suspending to 
veer toward lateral agency. 
Yet, if for Clough et al. the question is whether 
labor power can be in excess of the body, I might 
phrase this differently: Can it be excess body? In 
other words, can labor power accrue in and as 
excessive bodies, obese bodies? Can labor power 
be fat? Clough et al. find a route into this strange 
transhuman matter through affect. I wonder if we 
can arrive at the same through bignesses, under-
stood as both people and substance, as both big 
data (inorganic bodies-of-information) and big 
populations (obese bodies-as-organisms).
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Clough’s gross inclusions lend unexpected cre-
dence to the counterintuitive confusion between 
data as external object (product of labor) and data 
as included-in-subject (part of the laboring body). 
If affect is in matter, and an affective theory of 
value moves beyond the body-as-organism, we 
can reconsider that laboring body as including 
“connections between different levels of matter,”38 
including data. So the profile isn’t personal. We 
don’t produce self. We aren’t who or what or how 
we think we are. We are, it seems, much bigger, 
more materially diverse, and crowd-like. 
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This leads us to the question of how a crowd-
body that collects even-handedly such onto-
graphic litanies as {self, multitude, data} or {plastic, 
fat, fact} or {points, lines, planes} might function. 
In my reading, a collective body-of-obesity/body-
of-information models object-oriented feminist 
transhumanism and embodies decelerationist aes-
thetics. A transhuman body is capable of lateral 
agency, also described by Berlant as “the forms 
of spreading pleasure . . . necessary to lubricate 
the body’s movement through capitalized time’s 
shortened circuit.”39 If such a quite-crowded body 
already consists in and troubles {labor, labor power, 
commodity}, how else might it interface with capi-
talism? How might it deploy itself in relationships 
of power and pathos to “mov[e] through capital-
ized [time]”?
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Bodies
“Big” Body Politics
We have seen how, in the transition from point to 
line to plane, a body accrues information and sub-
stance and, at the same, paradoxically, becomes 
increasingly ill-defined. Points amass their indi-
viduality until a sense of self is lost. Lines stretch 
their contours until a profile is rendered indistinct. 
And planes sprawl until the organic and infor-
mational populations they support cross over to 
bear one another’s resemblance. At each step we 
witness both accumulation (the rise of form) and 
ambiguity (the formlessness of form).
In an era of biopower, big data and obesity 
require intensive management. It is exactly this 
management that renders both irreparably vague. 
But rather than lament subjects’ subsumption into 
something “bigger than you,” I’d like to pursue, 
within this condition, a decelerationist form of 
object-oriented politics. If the tendency of “human 
actions and appetites” as “lines, planes, and 
bodies” is toward vagueness, that vagueness only 
awaits turning imperceptible.
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If vague, a radical object-oriented feminist 
politics should not be expected to take the opposi-
tional, demand-wielding forms with which we are 
most familiar. Just as object-oriented philosophy 
demotes the philosophical subject from its place 
of privilege, an object-oriented politics should 
look beyond the political subject and the dynam-
ics of intersubjectivity that dominate political 
thought. One example of a political theory that 
accomplishes this is Elizabeth Grosz’s “politics of 
imperceptibility.” 
In a critique of postcolonial feminist and anti-
racist politics of recognition, Grosz argues that 
they (as well as many political models typically 
cast as progressive) rely on a Hegelian model of 
intersubjectivity, in which the processes of rec-
ognition, identification, and subject formation 
are tightly intertwined.40 It would not, I think, be 
stretching Grosz’s point to say such politics are 
too subject-oriented. Rather than favor recogni-
tion and identification, which lead to the forma-
tion of humanist political subjects, Grosz turns to 
Nietzsche, whose nihilistic conception of forces 
leads her to an inhuman politics of imperceptibil-
ity, akin to what I have been calling vagueness. 
32      KaTherine Behar      33 bodies
Drawing from Nietzsche, she writes, “Force needs 
to be understood in its full sub-human and super-
human resonances: as [Lyotard’s] inhuman . . . 
which both makes the human possible and which 
at the same time positions the human within a 
world where force works in spite of and around 
the human.”41
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Forgoing both recognition and identifica-
tion, and forsaking the subject as political agent, 
Grosz’s inhuman politics stands in contrast to 
most other feminist and antiracist strategies, 
including Judith Butler’s post-Hegelian decon-
struction of the subject, which remains, for Grosz, 
always humanist.42 On this important point, Grosz 
writes: “Denaturalizing is important. But it is not 
my project. We have, by now, been denaturalized 
as much as we need to be. What I’m much more 
interested in [is a] sort of renaturalizing that has 
been taken away, redynamizing a sort of nature.”43
The sense that we are already thoroughly 
deconstructed, and that this deconstruction has 
only facilitated our being reprocessed and ratio-
nalized, echoes the progressive complaint against 
neoliberalism, but through terms that will be 
more sympathetic to object-oriented thought, 
which itself has been accused of neoliberal lean-
ings.44 Construing the subject as deconstructed, 
lateral, multiple, rhizomatic, etc., has yet to liber-
ate subjects, but in fact has anticipated changes in 
the shape of forces of oppression, which in turn 
differently construe themselves against those 
same subjects of revision. Perhaps surprisingly, 
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object-oriented theories may be able to accom-
modate Grosz’s alternative. For example, we might 
locate a gesture toward imperceptibility in Graham 
Harman’s withdrawn objects’ reserve of inacces-
sible excess that prevents their being exhausted 
in and by networks of relations. Indeed, for Levi 
Bryant, withdrawal makes Harman’s philosophy 
a “powerful challenge to . . . ‘identity philosophy’” 
and “to the theory of calculation and mastery upon 
which neoliberal ideology is founded.”45 By veer-
ing away from identity and capture, withdrawn 
objects elicit the impersonal and imperceptible.
In her essay “The Impersonal Is Political: 
Spinoza and a Feminist Politics of Imperceptibility,” 
Hasana Sharp further connects the impersonal 
forces of Grosz with Spinoza. To Sharp’s think-
ing, Spinoza “offers [Grosz] a rubric of analysis 
that denies the radical uniqueness of human being 
with respect to the rest of nature.”46 Sharp writes, 
“A Spinozan politics necessarily entails the collab-
oration of others, but it is important to consider 
those others to include more than human beings, 
and to consider the causes and effects of our col-
lective interaction in excess of consciousness 
or intersubjectivity.”47 Like Clough’s conception 
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of affect-itself in excess of body-as-organism, 
Spinoza’s politics is grounded in matter or sub-
stance, and suggests radical continuity between 
all forms of being.48 
Sharp associates Spinoza’s “hyper-rational” 
political thought with Grosz’s call for “greater 
abstraction in feminist theory.”49 Indeed, both 
thinkers arrive at inhumanism through abstrac-
tion, a process by which political existence shifts 
from being explicit to being vague. Abstraction 
creates big bodies through the move toward imper-
ceptibility that Sharp identifies with Spinoza’s 
“polemic” of “getting over oneself.”50 
While we may be tempted to understand 
imperceptibility as a “micro” relation, passing 
“below the radar” of perception, in this political 
dimension it is in fact best understood quite dif-
ferently. Bigness does not make one more visible 
and specific; such bigness would only amount to 
being more vulnerable to capture and accountabil-
ity. Counterintuitively, becoming big makes one 
more imperceptible and generic; this abstract big-
ness thwarts systems of control with illegibility. 
Hence, imperceptibility is not about disappear-
ing into something “bigger than you,” but about 
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becoming indistinguishable from that bigness. 
When it comes to self and other kinds of infor-
mation, the inclusive abstraction that dilates data 
makes these differences imperceptible. It is about 
being bigger than oneself, oneself: like Norman 
Bombardini, both self and aggregate. 
Indeed, if bigness first swells a figure into 
oafish obviousness, the gross stereotype of indi-
vidual obesity, abstraction quickly causes it to 
outgrow the figure’s specificity. Becoming even 
bigger blurs the figure into a generic ground that 
forestalls conscious focus and recedes from per-
ception. Like Bombardini eating on the edge of an 
abstraction in which the singular self gives way 
to populations and substance, here the gesture 
of inscribing a profile makes an abstract mark, 
“incorporating” diverse points into the same body. 
It is as much as to say, these things are the same 
thing.
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One Persists
Bigness is sameness. It is thermodynamic entropy 
played out to the end. As Spinoza writes, “Nature is 
always the same.”51 With sameness, the impercepti-
bility advanced by a big body politics diverges from 
Grosz in a small but significant way. For Grosz, 
Nietzschean force is agonistic and fulfills itself in 
becoming.52 Yet, this kind of dynamism feels alien 
to big being, which seems to need a decelerated 
form of force closer to mere, simple persistence. 
From point to line to plane to body, each aesthetic 
form we have considered has gradually expanded 
and gently decelerated expressions of self. So can 
we use this notion of deceleration to conceive a 
more lethargic politics?
For Spinoza, part of any being’s essence is a 
power to act understood, as philosopher Steven 
Nadler explains, as a “power to persevere in being,”53 
which is to say, to hold an outline, to cohere in 
form, to persist. Much as Latour et al. advance per-
sistence of form across gradual temporal change, 
Spinoza’s term conatus describes this “kind of exis-
tential inertia.”54 Accordingly, political resistance 
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in this model is not oppositional, not little, and not 
about action. For example, practices like sousveil-
lance, in which small actors watch the big from 
below, are not what’s at stake. Instead, a politics of 
imperceptibility mobilizes correspondences, vast-
ness, and stasis. 
In stasis, individual laborers cease to work and 
the commodity labor power ceases to function. 
Critics of object-oriented theory are mistaken to 
associate being an object with oppression. Not 
being an object, but being circulated as such in 
the generation of value, is what oppresses. And 
so deceleration grinds circulation to a near halt; 
bigness swallows value, the unevenness that is the 
motor of capitalism and exceptionalism; and labor 
power idles in a state of listlessness. When bigness 
can barely budge, exchangeability breaks down. 
The inertia of conatus sets in.
Here, a big body politics finds its ethics. Such 
slow bigness evokes the yogic principle of ahimsa, 
or nonviolence. In his commentary on “Book 
Two” of The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, Sri Swami 
Satchidananda explains that ahimsa should not be 
understood as not acting violently, but as refrain-
ing from any harm, even so much as thinking 
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harmful thoughts.55 For Irina Aristarkhova, the 
practice of ahimsa in Jainism manifests the 
enlarged scope of transpecies feminist practices 
of care.56 Care summons responsibility toward the 
otherwise-mattered populations and collective 
forms we have examined here. 
Rubbing up close with otherness produces fric-
tion, like static electricity. Can we be static, nearly 
still? Bonded together in a static force field, differ-
ence generates dampened prickles of energy and 
even—persisting and tingling in stasis—aware-
ness. Ahimsa stands aware as slow, considered 
mindfulness. This friction is no rapid, repellent 
antagonism—far from it. The extreme prudence 
in ahimsa requires a radical slowdown to a pace 
against which the momentum of reactivity no 
longer holds sway. 
Ahimsa is an aspect of the first of the eight 
limbs of yoga, yama, which Satchidananda trans-
lates as “abstinence.” Yama is the abstention from 
the very assertion of self, like Berlant’s self- 
abeyance. Rather than acting with force or react-
ing to force, yama abstains from any agitations. So, 
too, the politics of decelerationist aesthetics slumps 
against connections and correlations, along with 
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the politics of recognition and even representation. 
In such a spirit, François Laruelle’s One summons 
radical inclusiveness in the manifold-turned- 
singular, evoking the “more” we associate with 
bigness (and the geometrical structure adopted 
here):
The One is immanence (to) itself 
without constituting a point, a plane, 
without withdrawing or folding 
back upon itself. It is One-in-One, 
that which can only be found in the 
One, not with Being or the Other. It 
is a radical rather than an absolute 
immanence. The ‘more’ immanence 
is radical, the ‘more’ it is universal or 
gives-in-immanence philosophy itself 
(the World, etc.).57 
In his hyperobjects, Timothy Morton bounces 
object-oriented thinking up a level to the vast-
ness of ecological scale and geological time. Like 
geologic sediment, a big body politics is uncon-
cerned with minutia like mere human life, and 
the other bits, informational and otherwise, that 
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compose it. Lethargically, separation converges 
in One. Things settle, and entropy overrides varia-
tion. Sharp apprises us that “[a] feminist poli-
tics of imperceptibility simply siphons enabling 
energy and power wherever it happens to find 
it.”58 Drawing a line through geologic time, a “slow 
death” of populations eases in, coming to embody 
a subtle standstill. “Inside this circle,” Latour et al. 
explain, “everything might change through time. 
. . . What matters is that the change be gradual 
enough to preserve some continuity.”59 
Imperceptibly, all things persist, existing as a 
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